https://thediplomat.com/2021/06/dont-expect-pakistan-to-host-us-military-bases/
In some respects this is a small story and received little
attention but it deserves a second look. The Taliban has protested regarding US
drone strikes in Afghanistan and particularly the targeted killing of al Qaeda
leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. They are of course upset with Washington but the real
target of their accusations and perhaps their ire is Pakistan. The Taliban
accuses Islamabad of hosting US drones or at the very least allowing them to
strike from its airspace.
At one time this was a well known reality but it wasn't
supposed to be the case anymore. Pakistani-US relations have all but tanked
over the past decade and while there have been moments of rapprochement,
Islamabad has officially made it pretty clear that it doesn't want Washington
using Pakistan as a base.
Everyone focused on the killing of Ayman al-Zawahiri, but
what the coverage missed was the notable shift in Pakistani policy. Last year
(especially after the Afghan pullout) publications like The Hill spoke of US using
drones in Pakistan as an impossibility. But by July 2022 (when al-Zawahiri was
killed) it appears the unthinkable became not only possible – but likely.
What changed? It's hard to say but it's noteworthy that the
'shift' came more or less in conjunction with the ousting of Imran Khan who not
only was forced out of power in April 2022 but is now facing indictments. Some
have referred to the incident as a soft coup and Khan for his part has spoken
openly of US machinations.
Even those who have little trouble believing such a charge
have admitted there's no smoking gun, no fingerprints that point to US
involvement. Khan's charges cannot be proven – or disproven.
However, most would acknowledge the US has long-established
ties within the Pakistani political order and certainly the military. As such
there wouldn't necessarily be a trail – the whole thing could have been planned
by a few choice meetings or even carefully choreographed phone calls.
Washington's involvement and the nature of its relationship
with Pakistan has remained highly secret. The relationship went into a nosedive
after 2011 and though there have been the aforementioned moments of
rapprochement, it has never recovered. That said, even during some of the tensest
moments it's possible that elements within the Pakistani government, military
and intelligence were aware the CIA was still running operations – and at times
collaborating with them. There are several rival factions contending for power
within Pakistan.
There are still many questions about the Bin Laden raid even
though such questions are considered out of bounds. Just ask Seymour Hersh – he
was all but blacklisted for daring to question the official narrative.
That same year (2011) saw some terrible friendly fire
incidents as well as the notorious Raymond Davis episode – a CIA operative
captured on the streets of Karachi after having shot several men. After these
incidents, Islamabad more or less shut down US operations and for Washington,
the waging of the war across the border became almost an impossibility. There
were other options but they were far more difficult and costly.
The Pakistan-based logistical supply routes which were closed
in 2011 did quietly reopen in 2012 but apparently a lot of the supply-line focus
permanently shifted to Central Asia by means of the Northern Distribution
Network or NDN. Goods passed through Baltic ports via Russia by train into Central
Asia. Some of the logistics were handled by South Korea due to US-Uzbek
tensions and Russia completely shut down this pathway in 2015 (in response to
US sanctions over Crimea). Another route was via Black Sea ports into
Azerbaijan and then across the Caspian Sea into Turkmenistan. These routes were
many times more expensive than the already exorbitant costs associated with the
Pakistan route. If a gallon of gas for US military operations was costing about
$400 in 2009, one can only imagine the cost after 2011 and then with added
inflation by the final years in 2020 and 2021.
From day one, weaponry has always been flown in – at extremely
high costs, usually from the same Indian Ocean staging grounds that were used
for bringing in goods via the Pakistan (Karachi) route. To fly in weapons
across the NDN would have been even more prohibitive.
In other words given the landlocked nature of Afghanistan,
all operations required the traversal of one or more countries and with the US
pullout in 2021 – there's no access anymore apart from the Black Sea-Caspian
route which would only be for cargo. The Russian route is closed. The only
other way to access the country – especially for a drone strike would be out of
Central Asia or Pakistan.
The Central Asia countries demonstrated years ago that they
were uncomfortable with Washington running military ops from within their
boundaries. It was one thing to bring trains and trucks through but they didn't
want combat aircraft and troops operating from their territory – or even
traversing it. Uzbekistan kicked the Americans out in 2005 and the departure
from Kyrgyzstan in 2014 marked the end of any US military presence in Central
Asia. And unless that's changed, then all the evidence of a drone base or drone
over flight points to Pakistan.
And yet under Khan this wasn't going to happen. He was not a
fan of Washington and American officials made it very clear they were not keen
on him. Trump attempted one of his grandstanding song and dance routines with
him – but it was another case of ridiculous theatre and came to nothing.
Clearly the US wants to operate out of Pakistan and yet Khan
was in the way. And so within a few short months, Khan is removed and the US
scores a huge drone strike. Is this just a coincidence? Some will say it is but
I am among those who highly doubt it.
At the very least the US acted quickly in the wake of Khan's
ouster. That's possible but it's all rather suspicious, all the more
considering the animosity between Khan and Washington. It just seems a little
too convenient.
An argument against this theory is an appeal to the historic
relationship between Islamabad and Beijing considered alongside the fact that
Washington has continued to move closer to New Delhi. This would suggest that
the hostility in Islamabad to Washington has probably intensified in recent
years. With the Belt and Road (BRI) projects in Pakistan including the new Chinese-Pakistan
Economic Corridor (CPEC) port at Gwadar, and given that Washington and Beijing
have grown openly hostile, a move toward Washington by Pakistan seems unlikely.
However, the ruling PML-N party headed by Shehbaz Sharif has
a track record of getting along better with Washington than some of the other
political factions. And so like all subordinate powers, Pakistan may be hedging
its bets and trying to play off Washington and Beijing against one another –
with a hope of scoring more benefits for Pakistan. Pakistan still has financial
ties to the West and if Islamabad can score a few points with Washington, that
can go a long way in easing the pressure put on by international bankers.
In the end, the nature of these developments is still unknown – Is the Pakistani permission for the US to run drone missions from its soil (or airspace) a matter of coincidence, opportunism, or a conspiracy? Perhaps time will reveal this to us. If Khan was ousted by those working in concert with the US, it will be one of the great scandals in Pakistani political history – and that's saying something.
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