The Context for the Tigray Revolt

There's been a fair bit of news coverage regarding the situation in Ethiopia but as is often the case – little contextualisation. A quick survey will help to explain the nature of the conflict and its potential dangers to the wider region.

The Ethiopian Emperor Hailie Selassie was overthrown in 1974 and replaced by the Communist affiliated Derg which under the leadership of Mengistu Haile Mariam continued to rule until 1987. At that point Mengistu reorganised the nation's political system and continued to rule until his regime collapsed and was overthrown in 1991.

At that time a transitional government was formed and eventually the coalition known as the EPRDF (Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front) came to power and would continue to more or less rule Ethiopia until 2018.

As with any long-term political arrangement there were problems of corruption, there were tensions among the factions, and the central government would often deal brutally with dissidents, leading to a complete collapse in popular support. Though a coalition, the Tigray ethnic group centred in the north of the country held considerable sway – Meles Zenawi headed both the Tigray movement and was prime minister of Ethiopia from 1995-2012.

It was also during this time (in 1991) that Eritrea gained its independence and because of this, as of 1993 Ethiopia officially became a landlocked country. This reality has been deemed unacceptable to many within Ethiopia (such as the Tigray) and this has fueled the ongoing tensions with Eritrea which in the past have led to war. This also plays a part in the larger story as the current Tigray conflict seems to spreading and has already affected Eritrea with explosions being reported in Asmara on 28 November. Eritrea for its part has ended up becoming an oppressive police state – eclipsed only by the likes of North Korea. It usually ranks among the worst countries for Christians (of the Evangelical and Protestant variety).

In 2018 the dominant EPRDF was finally defeated in elections and replaced by Abiy Ahmed. As a result the EPRDF was dismantled and replaced by the newly formed Prosperity Party (PB) in 2019.

Ahmed's government marked a shift in Ethiopia's political structure and he has been something of a sensation working toward peace with Eritrea (for which he received the Nobel Peace Prize), securing access to ports, promoting privatisation schemes, and he has also brought in an era of openness and clemency. Overall, the Ethiopian population and the larger political Establishment within East Africa have been pleased – the Tigray political leadership (TPLF) excepted.

The US government for its part has been reserved. Used to working with the EPRDF, Washington has been pleased that Ahmed hasn't attempted to curtail the military relationship with the US. Since 9/11, Ethiopia has served as a base and sometime proxy for US regional interests, especially with regard to Somalia. It also hosted Black Sites. In addition to the military cooperation, Ahmed's new privatisation scheme undoubtedly has pleased many on Wall Street.

However, there are those who are uncomfortable with Ahmed's overall switch in posture to probably something less than subservient and one geared more toward Ethiopia's outward projection which is stoking tensions with US allied neighbours Egypt and as of last year, Sudan. Ahmed has also warmed to China far more than his predecessors. On the Chinese Foreign Minister's 2019 Africa trip, his first stop was to see Ahmed. China's growing presence in Africa fuels American angst and now the growing tensions with Washington's old and new regional allies isn't helping to instill confidence in Ahmed.

In other words there's the risk of instability, another shift in the escalating contest and scramble for Africa. China's regional interests had (until recently) suffered a serious setback in the creation of South Sudan in 2011. Beijing lost control of Sudanese oil which was mostly based in the south. However, a civil war (also something of a proxy war) developed which seems to have finally come to an end earlier this year. The Chinese not only put peacekeeping troops in (a milestone in itself) but by being willing to operate their petroleum extraction operations within the conflict zone (the kind of risk Western markets abhor), Beijing remained in good standing with the warring parties and having helped to broker the peace, has now been able to re-assert itself in the country. Oil dominates the South Sudanese budget and given that China (at considerable risk) controls the industry – their role and scale of influence is pretty clear. The once US victory has been significantly reduced.

But just as this was happening Washington scored an unforeseen coup in Sudan proper to the north with the ouster of longtime Beijing ally Omar al-Bashir. The new government in Khartoum is in the process of reorienting toward the United States (partly under threat) and so this marks a geopolitical loss for China. The fact that Tigray refugees are fleeing into Sudan and risk destabilising the new regime is something everyone is watching. And it's also noteworthy that the region's major oil pipeline ends at Port Sudan – under the jurisdiction of Khartoum.

In other words, China has every reason to make trouble for American regional interests and the Tigray conflict is creating the conditions for a wider regional conflict. It's not a proxy war but it could quickly turn into one.

The Tigray, key players in the post-Derg political structure are out of power. They are not part of the Prosperity Power coalition and for the first time since 1991, they're acutely feeling their minority status. Their attempts to assert autonomy in their northern enclave have been met with resistance and Addis Ababa's campaign has destabilised the wider region which has the potential to explode – rekindling conflicts within Ethiopia and on its perimeter. The Eritreans are already involved. Undoubtedly there are some factions within their system that don't want to see peace with Ethiopia – just as the Tigray never wanted the peace deal. There are also Eritrean populations in the Tigray region. And there are certainly elements within not only the Tigray Establishment but the wider scope of Ethiopian politics that are unhappy with Ahmed and his agenda.  

While some in Washington would probably prefer to see the Gebremichael led TPLF (Tigray People's Liberation Front) back in the coalition government, there are others who simply don't like Ahmed and would like to see him gone. The US has sent signals of its displeasure by cutting funds and giving voice to humanitarian groups that are critical of Ahmed's government – even though to many he's been a great liberalizer, one who has freed political prisoners and the like. The Trump administration even threatened Ahmed over the issue of the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam – a point of contention with both Sudan and Egypt – both nations (but especially al Sisi's Egypt) are also US allies. As mentioned Ethiopia is also an ally, but under the current Ahmed administration Addis Ababa's star has fallen.

Much more could be said about the various ethnic Christian groups in the region – all subject to Western influence and used for propaganda purposes.

Hopefully the situation in Tigray will calm as continued instability could spread and eventually affect not just the Horn but the larger Northeast region. From Cairo to Mombasa and Beijing to Washington, everyone is watching.