The Multifaceted Competition Continues in Central Asia

https://eurasianet.org/us-strikes-mineral-deals-with-uzbekistan-tashkent-report

https://eurasianet.org/kyrgyz-pm-gets-polite-brush-off-by-us-business-executives

https://www.eurasiantimes.com/china-intrudes-in-russias-backyard-as-moscow/

https://www.asianews.it/news-en/Central-Asia-and-Beijing-after-the-Astana-summit-63374.html

https://eurasianet.org/united-states-and-russia-angling-for-influence-in-turkmenistan

https://eurasianet.org/rumors-of-chinese-land-deals-spark-public-unease-in-uzbekistan

As Ankara seeks to work with Azerbaijan in the creation of a new energy and trade corridor connected to Central Asia, the other big players are also quite active and the region is astir.

Uzbekistan has signalled in recent years a willingness to trade and do business outside Moscow's purview. The so-called Middle Corridor has made this possible. A double landlocked country, Uzbekistan faces logistic difficulties but as of 2022, this new route utilizes train-ferries that can cross the Caspian Sea from Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan and then access the Black Sea to cross to Europe. This opens up Uzbekistan (and potentially the other Central Asian nations) to trade with Europe and the United States - and it completely bypasses Russian territory which had hitherto been essential for such transport.

Likewise new corridors are opening to China (the China-Kyrgystan-Uzbekistan Railway) - which will also facilitate direct overland rail transport from Chinese factories to the EU - either by the traditional route across Russia or via the Caspian/Black Sea Middle Corridor.

And if Afghanistan can remain stable, there are potential routes into Pakistan which would bring the goods to the Indian Ocean. These are routes the US once coveted but now they will in all likelihood become dominated by Chinese interests.

Washington has promised Tashkent nuclear energy assistance in order to access its rare earth resources. Beijing is investing in other solar and wind-related energy projects but at the same time there is some angst regarding Chinese real estate acquisitions with Uzbekistan. The Eurasianet article in question speaks of 'rumours' and it's not too hard to imagine who might have interest in seeing such rumours spread. Western media is also using this as yet another occasion to argue the Debt-Trap diplomacy line - that due to Tashkent's trade deficit and debt, Beijing is able to squeeze concessions. This is China's backhanded and subtle way of exerting control of its trade partners. The US does this every day but there is genuine alarm at the extent of Beijing's international investment and with BRICS becoming a more global player, the US increasingly finds itself in these multi-polar situations, where it is having to genuinely compete. Washington has long used the language of competition in the name of freedom - but it has never been sincere in this and when faced with true rivalry, it's evident the Washington Establishment is upset if not alarmed.

At the end of June, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov was in Ashgabat seeking to retain Russian standing in Turkmenistan by means of soft-power initiatives. As Eurasianet reports, while Lavrov was in Turkmenistan, Marco Rubio was on the phone reaching out to the Turkmen foreign minister, clearly hoping to curry some good favour. The US attempted to set up bases in Central Asia after 9/11 but these efforts eventually collapsed as the US got sidetracked in Iraq, and both Moscow and Beijing did everything they could to discourage further ties and American military presence - which both China and Russia viewed as a threat and attempted encirclement. But now as the US is making inroads once again, it's certain the US is eyeing Turkmenistan's new airport that has runways able to accommodate American fighters and cargo aircraft.

Around the same time, a Central Asia-China summit was taking place in Astana, Kazakhstan focusing on trade and energy deals and of course the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China is hungry for energy and in particular electricity. Just this week Beijing has started construction of the world's largest dam in Tibet on the Yarlung Tsangpo River - which once it crosses into India is known as the Brahamaputra. Needless to say, neither the Tibetans nor New Delhi, nor Bangladesh are pleased with this development as China's project will affect India's Northeast districts. From there the river flows into Bangladesh and is major contributor to the massive delta in the region once simply known as Bengal - a region home to 280 million people.

One of the concerns is related to the glacier-fed nature of the river. As the region continues to warm, there will probably several decades of increased flow leading to the energy production Beijing desires. But after that point, flow will decrease and it's likely Beijing will 'hold back' water in order to use it more efficiently for energy production. This will lead to lower water levels down river. China counters by arguing that only about 25% of the river's volume is glacier fed and most of the water arriving in Bengal is generated from within in India itself.

At the Kazakhstan summit, China also condemned US tariff policies and the instability it generates and also reached out in terms of soft power - offering opportunities for study and training in China itself.

At the same time the Kirghiz prime minister received a cold shoulder during a recent visit to Washington. Kyrgyzstan-American relations have soured over the past decade and Bishkek remains entrenched in the Russian orbit. Of course, the US has poured salt on the wound. After the Kirghiz shut down the American base in 2014, the US has put a media spotlight on the nation's democratic activists and dissidents and during the Covid-19 pandemic, Kyrgyzstan was one of the countries targeted by the CIA - the Americans waged a covert and deceitful propaganda campaign attempting to discredit Beijing's vaccine. How much social chaos this furthered and how many deaths resulted is difficult to quantify. Neverthelss Kasymaliev (the Kirghiz prime minister) was able to secure loans through the IMF and World Bank - opening some doors to G7 investment and interest.

The region is complicated and awash with diplomats, bankers, lawyers, and businessmen. This has been the case to some extent since 1991 - however the geopolitics of the region have at times frozen activity to some extent. The changing situation with Russia and China as well as renewed Western (US and EU) interest and Turkiye's role as potential trade facilitator are all contributing factors. Russia is (it would seem) in the process of being downgraded in terms of power in the region. Fears of Chinese domination have led to attempts at diplomatic and economic diversification. Central Asian resources and the sudden desperation to acquire them has given these nations more negotiating room and diplomatic clout - but also placed them in danger of domination by the Great Powers.

The Eurasian Times article openly speaks of a growing China-EU rivalry in the region. If the US can ever get Turkiye back within its orbit, the new logistical possibilities will mean Washington can really flex its muscle in the region. As I've suggested in the past, there are drawbacks to Central Asians cutting deals with Moscow, Beijing, and Washington. They all come with strings attached. This has made the EU somewhat attractive and Beijing clearly doesn't like it.

Russia, still bogged down in Ukraine and increasingly a pariah state looks like the big loser. It's down but not out, as US sanctions have proven ineffective at best but Moscow is paying a larger geopolitical price and Central Asia is a case in point.

And yet as the article suggests, Putin is not going to make noise about Chinese expansion and influence in the region. He can't afford to. And, all things considered, Moscow would rather see the Chinese in Central Asia than either the EU or the Americans. China has the advantage of geographic proximity and its command economy in terms of investment. It can move and make things happen at a tempo the West cannot.

The contest that emerged in the 1990's for Central Asia - part of Brzezinski's Grand Chessboard has been more or less won by China. But it's victory is not set in stone. It's facing some real challenges at the moment and this explains why Xi is so focused on the region. Further, he views it as critical to security as he does not want to see US military assets parked on his western frontier.

A regime change in Iran could also change the dynamics opening a new world of possibilities. Another large-scale Middle Eastern war could also drastically change calculations. And everyone continues to watch the situation in Afghanistan. Will the Taliban survive? Will the country ever become stable and viable for investment?

In the new Great Game, there are many factors at work and a Great Power could do something drastic - destabilising the region simply to cut out rivals and sabotage their projects. As always, it's the average people just trying to live who are caught in the middle. And this would include the small Christian populations that live quiet unassuming lives in these largely authoritarian states.

See also:

https://proto-protestantism.blogspot.com/2022/01/the-geopolitics-of-kazakhstan-protests.html

https://pilgrimunderground.blogspot.com/2019/12/movement-and-summits-in-central-asia-eu.html

https://pilgrimunderground.blogspot.com/2020/10/kyrgyzstans-latest-round-of-unrest.html

https://pilgrimunderground.blogspot.com/2023/08/the-now-less-than-great-game-extending.html

https://pilgrimunderground.blogspot.com/2025/06/the-grand-chessboard-20-central-asia.html

https://pilgrimunderground.blogspot.com/2021/01/reporting-on-chinas-fiscal-power-in.html