01 April 2018

An Army for Kosovo


Of course Washington and Belgrade have different views on whether or not Kosovo should have its own army. Serbia is but one of many nations that have refused to recognise the 2008 Washington created Pristina regime. Though the Western public has moved on, not everyone accepts the results of NATO's wars against the Serbs.


For the Serbian people, Kosovo is deeply rooted in their history. Previously I have compared the partition of Kosovo from Serbia to Virginia losing the Shenandoah. This of course only begins to explain the level of profound historical attachment. For Virginians, the visceral affection and bond to the valley is wed to the Civil War of 150 years ago. For the Serbs, Kosovo is the site of their great defeat in 1389, when their kingdom fell to the invading Ottoman Turks. It became one of their primary symbols of identity and emotional resistance.
Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated in 1914 on the anniversary of the battle. In 1987 on the 598th anniversary of the battle, Slobodan Milosevic promised that the Serbs would not suffer such a defeat again. He spoke from the battlefield itself and promised the Serbs victory and security. This was under the backdrop of a Yugoslavia already beginning to crumble. Milosevic was the president of Serbia, at the time an entity within federated Yugoslavia.
In 1989 on the 600th anniversary of the battle and once again from the battlefield, Milosevic said:
"None should be surprised that Serbia raised its head because of Kosovo this summer. Kosovo is the pure centre of its history, culture and memory. Every nation has one love that warms its heart. For Serbia it is Kosovo."
and
"Six centuries ago, Serbia heroically defended itself in the field of Kosovo, but it also defended Europe. Serbia was at that time the bastion that defended the European culture, religion, and European society in general."
Whether one agrees with Milosevic's sentiments or his historical interpretations is beside the point. It is noteworthy that to the Serbs, the NATO war against them was yet another case of Latin treachery and betrayal of the Byzantines. The Latin West stood with Kosovar Albanians who are Muslim in order to defeat Byzantine culture and irredentism. And worse, the Latin West partitioned what for them was and is Holy Kosovo.
One must understand that to the Serbs, this crime was their equivalent of the Fourth Crusade's betrayal and sack of Constantinople. If you understand what that meant to the Byzantines and Greeks, only then can you hope to understand what the Kosovo War means to the Serbs. As the Byzantines cursed Enrico Dandalo, so the Serbs curse Bill Clinton.
It must be understood the Serbs will never give up the dream of Kosovo. It's not possible. If you understand the way history and memory work in Eastern Europe and especially the Balkans you will begin to grasp this. Right or wrong, they (and the Orthodox especially) do not have a progressive concept of history. Such Westernisms are undoubtedly creeping in and yet they are far from permeating society and collective thought. Historical grievance can survive for generations and centuries. The conflicts and lingering bitterness of Middle Age defeats lived on and were easily revived in the 19th and 20th centuries. The Cold War put things on hold for a couple of generations only to be quickly rekindled in the 1990's.
At this point, many of the Serbs want to move on. The turmoil of the 1990's weighs heavily. But that's just war weariness. The dream is by no means dead and all it takes is a generation or two and all the feelings can come flooding back.*
What is the 'Serbian Strategy Regarding Kosovo' if we can even speak of such a thing? It is but a distant hope, a whisper on the wind, a dream that will not die.
At this point there isn't a lot of hope but what hope there is rests on a simple premise.
If the European Union (EU) blows up and fragments... move quickly and take Kosovo back. In terms of a larger series of questions, this strategy would also apply to Serb interests within Bosnia. Some have called for diplomatic solutions but they are clearly futile.
In fact the simmering Serb anger and its occasional vocalisation in the form of sabre-rattling or even the hint that there are still Serbs thinking about 'rolling back the clock' gives the United States a pretext for 'protecting' Kosovo from such a calamity. By means of this calculus, Washington's interference seems reasonable and a case of prudent and preventative security.
The United States has many agents and proxies at work within the European framework, not least of which is NATO. But Kosovo represents a special almost 'side' project within the Balkan sphere. For the past decade or so no one in the West has paid much attention but with the campaign against Russia and the increasingly volatile relationship with Turkey, the Balkans are emerging once more as a centre of geopolitical tension and starting to garner more attention.
Kosovo serves as an American proxy. If the European Union were to implode or collapse, Washington knows Pristina will remain a solid ally.
If it is just the Balkans that blow up, regardless of Brussels position on the matter, the US knows it has an ally in Pristina.
Kosovo is also being used as a frontline state in the US campaign against Russia. The US has a strategic base located in Kosovo which also functioned (and perhaps still functions) as a Black Site, a secret prison and torture centre.
Kosovo stands as a line in the sand to defy Russia and serves as a staging ground and hub for further Balkan operations. There is much afoot in neighbouring countries like Macedonia and many are closely watching Bulgarian and Greek politics.
It's understood that a strong NATO protected Kosovo will keep Serbia divided between nationalist factions and what might described as peace/European factions, in other words those that want to move on and integrate with Europe. A weak Kosovo will surely stoke Serbian dreams and foment nationalism and so the US will do all it can to bolster Pristina. Establishing an independent army is a basic and logical step Washington can take to strengthen what is otherwise a fairly weak country. It will anger many Serbs but in some ways, the US can benefit from this ire as well, if it plays its card right. It is the Kosovars who are in the immediate line of fire, but the US has never 'cared' about its allies. The ties aren't emotional but strategic. One could also argue that the creation of an army in Kosovo will allow some Serbs to move on and realise any dreams of reconquest are but pie-in-the-sky.
A Kosovo army will also afford the US greater opportunities to expand its footprint in the Balkans. There will be training projects and joint operations with the militaries of neighbouring countries. The defense contractors and investment bankers will come in. They're already there of course, but this will open up new doors. The already deep roots established by Washington will be all but set in stone, backed up by institutional ties, debt and threat.
There are lessons to be gleaned from such politicking. Yugoslavia was certainly doomed from the start. It was born of ugly imperial grasping and the break-up of empires. Birthed in the wake of WWI, it was forged as a means to unify small weak states and stave off the vultures that surrounded them. It tried to contain the evils of nationalism and irredentism. Yugoslavia hoped to remain neutral and exempt itself from outside interference but it was quickly pulled into WWII. It fractured and became a scene of tremendous violence which stokes the fires of bitterness even today. After the war, under the leadership of Tito it pursued an independent course that angered Moscow and dissatisfied the West. And yet the West certainly supported Tito, an exercise in Realpolitik designed to ensure the Balkan federation did not once more fall into the hands of Stalin and his successors. The Iron Curtain sat astride the Yugoslav borders with Austria, Italy and Greece but it was never of the same character as elsewhere. It was never part of the Warsaw Pact.
Its creation set historical questions on the back-burner and during this period other problems arose and in some cases were used to suppress nationalism. Kosovo was flooded with Albanian migrants, today's Kosovars. They had been there before but during the 20th century became the majority of the population. These demographic figures are a continuing source of dispute. What could be done? Should Kosovo be partitioned to reflect the demographic realities? How can democracy work otherwise? There was no viable hope of trans-ethnic consensus. Should there be a population exchange between Serb and Albanian sectors along the lines of what happened between Greece and Turkey in the 1920's?
These questions didn't really matter while Yugoslavia was in existence. It's break-up in the early 1990's unleashed these forces which had been contained since the end of World War II.
What about reparations? Will any group ever possibly be satisfied? Should portions of the Balkans be carved out and handed over to some kind of UN administration? No one apart from a small diplomatic class wants the UN to directly administer anything. Though many American Rightists fear the UN and criticise it as harmful to American interests the truth is the organisation is impotent and virtually no one supports the idea of granting it real and actual governance.
What if a Federated Yugoslavia was reconstituted? It could employ a political arrangement along the lines of Lebanon with strict requirements for each section of government that mandates representation from the various ethnic groups. Ironically there were even Slavophiles in the 19th century that defended the Habsburg Empire. They wanted reform to be sure but they also understood that the complicated history and demography of Central and Eastern Europe was a recipe for war. The Habsburgs for all their faults helped to contain these forces... forces which exploded during the world wars.
Yugoslavia was something of a Balkan attempt to create this same kind of federated unity, minus Teutonic governance. What if it was reconstituted and constitutionally neutral? It would not be able to join in any political bloc including NATO and the EU.
It will never happen because in reality the Western powers are more than willing to risk war than to lose their hold and influence.
And war they shall have. Whether tomorrow or in a generation it's already on the horizon. Like an edifice on a distant mountain, one can make it out but its distance is hard to gauge.
See also:
*As an aside this is at the heart of the arguments for and against public education. Those who wish to 'move on' from the confines of history argue compulsory public education is necessary to break with the past and the endless cycles of repetition and traditional thinking. It's only by changing the way the younger generation thinks can the ties be broken and in the case of the Byzantine Balkans and certainly with reference to Asiatics, only then can Western democratic and liberal values take hold.
Conversely, this is why some would argue that compulsory public education in such contexts is pernicious because it seeks to eradicate tradition. It is in a cultural sense, genocidal. While it doesn't seek to eliminate a population it seeks to destroy their identity, collective memory, ideology and heritage.
And yet hypocritically these same targeted elements are all too eager to employ compulsory public education to their ends and use it as a means to indoctrinate the next generation. There is an ongoing battle over children, something large numbers of Christians have even in 2018, failed to grasp.

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