03 July 2020

The Larger Context of the China-India Border Conflict


India and China have occasionally sparred since the modern iterations of their countries were formed in the aftermath of World War II. Their disputes are over borders, in this case an irregular and segmented 2100 mile long frontier in the Himalaya region. The conflicts have at times broken out into small-scale war, the worst of which took place in 1962 but as fighting in such terrain is logistically challenging, the wars remain constrained.


The 1962 conflict was also undoubtedly a reaction on the part of China to the Indian hosting of the exiled Dalai Lama who had finally been forced to flee Tibet in 1959. India was not hostile to Washington and yet relations were hardly cordial. The US worked with India on the issue of Tibet and New Delhi allowed the CIA to run aerial missions 'over the hump' into Tibet as they sought to insert and support Tibetan paramilitaries. This would continue throughout the 1960's.
And yet despite this combined anti-China policy, New Delhi and Washington didn't get along very well and this would grow into actual antagonism during the period of Indira Gandhi's rule (1966-1997, 1980-1984). Washington would move into a functional alliance with Pakistan which would prove convenient in the 1970's rapprochement with Beijing and the 1980's war in Afghanistan. India would remain non-aligned but would find the Soviet Union a convenient source for weaponry and other goods.
But in the years after 9/11, there's been a shift in US policy. The US still relies on Pakistan for logistical access to Afghanistan but Islamabad and Washington have largely gone separate ways. The US has warmed up to India, especially under the nationalist and pro-capitalist BJP government of Narendra Modi. This has turned into a functional military alliance which has turned India into a frontline state in terms of US posturing vis-à-vis Beijing.
Pakistan has of course remained in close partnership with China even while the old tensions with India going back to the days of Partition certainly remain – especially with regard to Kashmir. And north of Kashmir proper in the regions around Ladakh and Aksai Chin, the Indian government finds itself in conflict with China.
On the one hand these are historic disputes going back to the 1940's. On the other hand they've been amplified by the CPEC – the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, part of Beijing's larger OBOR (New Silk Road) project. The CPEC creates a transport and energy conduit between Xinjiang and the Pakistani port of Gwadar – something both Washington and New Delhi watch with apprehension.
Additionally, the headwaters of some of the Indus tributaries are in China and pass through these contested regions. While the Indus is mostly in Pakistan some of its abundant water sources move through Indian territory – and China has moved to construct dams which has angered New Delhi. There are also related disputes in the East where the Brahmaputra flows (as the Yarlung Tsangpo) out of Tibet and drops into Eastern India and joins the Ganges delta in Bengal.
To the Chinese, the Indians are building highways in the Himalayan regions and encroaching on their territory and putting their projects at risk. To New Delhi the Chinese are moving to solidify their hold on these otherwise disputed and controversial territories. The end result will be a Chinese strategic advantage and in the case of the CPEC – an advantage for Pakistan – India's mortal enemy.
But then consider the US factor and the US strategy with regard to China. The incorporation of India into the plan has expanded and enhanced the US goal to hem in China and to effectively encircle it from the standpoint of East and South – and if Central Asia ever goes Washington's way, from the West as well.
Modi knows he has Washington's blessing in terms of confronting China but many analysts are alarmed as the volatility of the region, the closer relationship between Islamabad and Beijing and of course the powder-keg quality to the India-Pakistan relationship means that it's not hard to imagine a regional war breaking out.
One has to wonder if the recent pseudo-scandal with regard to Russian involvement in Afghanistan is but a move (by the American Deep State) to sabotage the US withdrawal from the region. As things are heating up (as it were), there are powerful elements in Washington that want the US to stay directly involved in the larger region.
The US abandoned the Afghan project in the early 1990's after the Soviet withdrawal. Civil War tore the country apart and to calm the chaos the Pakistani ISI sponsored refugee talibs or students that had fled in the 1980's. The Taliban took on a life of its own and within a few years generated headlines and Western hostility. And yet for all its terrors it did bring some stability to the country. The US invasion in 2001 opened up a new round of war and the society is now decimated – having endured almost four decades of incessant war. A US withdrawal will leave the weak puppet government in Kabul completely vulnerable and if chaos ensues, it's likely that Islamabad will move once again to stabilise its neighbour. But this is 2020, not 1989.
If history repeats and Pakistan re-assumes its 1990's role in Afghanistan – then you can be sure that Beijing will come in right alongside them and that's something the US does not want to see. Aside from the geopolitics of such a move, there is the mineral wealth of Afghanistan – largely untapped at present. US plans have gone astray, even off the rails but the project has not been wholly abandoned – at least not yet. If elements within the Deep State can thwart a US withdrawal and at the same time re-kindle the failed Russiagate scandal then it's an easy call and the media has been quick to comply and spin the story.
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