23 October 2017

Iraqi Kurds Betrayed Again: A Quick Summary

The Kurds of Iraq were backed by the US through the Shah of Iran during the 1970s. This was when Tehran was a close US ally and Saddam Hussein had been pushed into the arms of the Soviets and thus had become Washington's enemy.


The US has a long history of opposing secular Arab regimes. This goes back to Egypt's Nasser and their attempts to assassinate him. During the Cold War the US preferred to work with 'religious' regimes as secular nationalism lacked zeal to fight communism and often due to the pragmatics of Middle Eastern geopolitics would end up doing deals with Moscow.
Then the Iranian Revolution happened in 1979 and the situation was (in part) reversed. Iran was now the enemy and Washington wanted to back Baghdad. The Kurds were left out in the cold and many of their leaders went into exile. Saddam waged a vicious campaign against them but by then Washington no longer cared about the Kurdish cause.
When the US turned against Saddam Hussein in 1990 the Kurds thought their moment had come. Rising up against Saddam they were again let down by the Americans and the promised independence did not arrive.
The reality was the US didn't want to antagonise neighbouring Turkey (a critical NATO ally) and in fact was supporting Ankara's vicious war against its own Kurdish population.
Additionally, despite official proclamations the US did not want Saddam's regime to fall in the 1990s. His presence justified US expansion into the Middle East and the bases in Saudi Arabia etc.
The Neo-Conservatives wanted him gone but in the 1990s they were still sidelined. Everything changed in September 2001.
The US did set up the No-Fly-Zones which effectively allowed the Kurds to gain a degree of autonomy and during the latter part of the 1990s they flourished.
There was talk of Iraqi partition in the wake of the 2003 US invasion and this was amplified by the chaos of the insurgency and the Civil War. By the end of the Bush administration and during the beginning of Obama's term, many US and Western elites were pushing for Kurdish independence and Iraqi partition. It seemed the only way to stop the expansion of Iranian influence into Iraq and effectively set up a barrier to Tehran's control of the north and the oil of the Kirkuk region.
But Turkey violently opposed this as they have always rejected any Kurdistan project. They fear (with cause) that it would lead to a revitalised secession movement in their southeast and a wider Middle Eastern war.
Everything was left on hold to simmer.
But then during Obama's second term ISIS expanded into Iraq. Born of the remnants of Iraqi al Qaeda and other groups, it arose in Syria and was (at least for a time) clandestinely (and largely by proxy) backed by the West. ISIS was a useful tool in the attempts to overthrow the Assad regime in Damascus.
But then ISIS took advantage of Baghdad's disarray, weakness and the grievance of Iraq's Sunni population and quickly expanded into Northern Iraq, taking Mosul and proclaiming a caliphate.
This changed the ground game. The US had lost a tremendous amount of influence in Baghdad as the new Shia regime had been moving steadily toward the Iranian sphere of influence, especially since 2011. The behaviour of the regime ran the risk of unleashing a new and massive war as many Sunnis were signing on with ISIS. Frustrated by Shia Baghdad's brutal tactics and blatant corruption they signed on with the caliphate. They didn't need to share its vision. The expulsion and defeat of Shiite dominated Baghdad would be enough.
Now all talk of a partitioned Iraq was set aside as the US moved toward re-establishing close ties with Baghdad. American troops were sent back in and it seemed ISIS was providing an opportunity, not only to justify US involvement in Syria but to bring Baghdad back into the US orbit. America's war in the Middle East was beginning a new chapter.
The US effort has been pretty bumpy and there have been setbacks, the largest being Russian involvement at the behest of Damascus. The Iran factor has see-sawed as the US is in a de facto alliance with Iran vs. ISIS in Iraq. But then the US is opposing Tehran in Syria. In the meantime the Israelis are basing anti-Iranian operations in Kurdistan and Azerbaijan and the US under Obama signed a deal to end the Iranian weapons programme.
It's a complicated merry-go-round and there are a lot of players and factions involved. They winds change constantly. I'm not sure if anyone can fully keep up with it all.
For the Kurds this was the great conflict of the new generation. The sons of the men who fought Saddam were now engaged in the most serious challenge they as a people had faced... ISIS.
Overrun by violent zealots and Sunni extremists they united and played a very large role in driving ISIS from Iraq. Additionally their Kurdish cousins in Syria have been backed by the United States in the push to defeat ISIS and (it was hoped) finish the war on Assad.
The Syrian conflict degenerated into a stalemate. ISIS has been mostly defeated and even now the stage is being set for the next chapter.
But back in Iraq, the Kurds had liberated their country from the clutches of a monstrous regime. More than ever they felt not only the sense of autonomy by the prerogative to rule themselves and join the family of nations, to right the wrongs of Sykes-Picot and the maps drawn during the Ottoman sunset. Mere regional autonomy seemed anticlimax. They gained massive political capital and they wanted to utilise it. They have shed blood and spent their treasure and they want something for it. After such a fight and victory no one wants to return to the status quo.
The referendum and declaration of independence followed and Baghdad moved quickly to counter it. There was no way they were going to just let Kirkuk or the whole of Northern Iraq and its oil just slip away. The Kurds seem to have miscalculated and are (at present) in retreat.
Did they misread the shifting of political winds? Five years ago they might have been supported. Had ISIS not arisen (and given the antagonism with Erdogan which has only grown worse since 2016) Washington might have supported such a move. But now Washington is back trying to hold Baghdad and given the situation between Turkey, Russia and Syria, they don't want the Kurds to break away right now. For Washington the timing is all wrong but for the Kurds, this is the moment.
Their declaration of independence was built on long-standing dreams and hopes firmly established by US support for them in the 1990s. The previous betrayals had been forgiven. Now they seem to have been abandoned once more and face a moment of great danger. Not only will Baghdad press its claims but the Kurds have to know that if they start scoring victories, Turkey will invade from the north.
Their only hope was US backing, coupled with Israeli machinations on the ground and behind the scenes.
Suddenly all of this is in doubt and the victory over ISIS may mark the beginning of a new chapter for them and maybe even a massive defeat. They're feeling very alone right now.
The story isn't over by any means. It's been going on for a long time but I continue to be amazed that the Kurds would trust the United States. I suppose in many ways they have little choice. Their neighbourhood is about as tough as it gets and the deck is heavily stacked against them.

The truth is, the United States never cared about them or their cause. It uses them and dispenses with them as needed. On one level every 'small' country or group realises this when they enter into relationships with the great powers and yet the feelings must be very bitter indeed.

2 comments:

  1. The US and Iran have had open hostility since the Revolution, but it seems to have been pretty phony. Reagan's team had made deals with the regime to postpone releasing hostages for future deals. Weapons to Iran started before the need to supply the Contras. How do you feature this double-dealing into the picture? Is this a kind of tug-of-war to back Iran as a means of control, to try and keep it from assuming its tradition place as node of central Asia? In the Great Game, Britain and Russia never tried to topple Persia, but sufficiently corrupt it and put a bit in its mouth. Is the seemingly contradictory relation with Iran a variety on strategy of tension?

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  2. I think it just demonstrates these people for all their preaching of ideals are just opportunists and scoundrels on the take. Power is the means and the end.

    Nixon sabotaged peace talks in 1968 because he thought it would help him get elected. There's a conspiracy the public will accept... because it's Nixon. I often hear his defenders say he was no worse than any of the others. I used to say that myself. But you know what? For the most part it's true.

    Nixon sabotaged the talks and didn't care that tens of thousands of US lives would be lost and maybe another million or so Indochinese would die. He didn't care. He didn't mind shaking hands with blood-soaked Mao because it was a way to 'stick it' to the Soviets.

    I think the Reagan crowd was the same. The Israelis clearly are. That said, they'll turn on these same people in a moment. It's dog-eat-dog and I'm sure many people who haunt the halls of power laugh at UN and presidential speeches. It's all nonsense, fodder for the masses and the fools in the media and academia that believe it... the one's who largely write the 'officially sanctioned' histories.

    As far as weapons to Iran before the Contras hour of need... that was just pure pragmatics. Iran desperately needed weapons and things like tires. Their equipment was mostly of US origin due to the years under the Shah. The Israelis stepped in as they obviously had access to a lot of US stuff.

    The US ultimately and primarily backed Iraq during the 1980s war but had no problem selling stuff to Iran if it served their purposes. The Israelis didn't like Iran after 1979 but they fear their Arab neighbours more and so to help foment war... sure, sell stuff to Tehran.

    Iran's sphere in CentAsia is limited to the Tajik communities... many of which are in Uzbekistan and the Tajiks (and Hazara) in Western and Northern Afghanistan. If the US can manipulate Tehran into using these groups to make trouble for the Russians in CentAsia or the Taliban around Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif... then they would certainly do so.

    Of course Tehran knows the score and they would be reticent to totally alienate Moscow. I keep watching Azerbaijan. That's a place that could draw both Moscow and Tehran... a historical knot that at present has fallen under the shadow of US interests. The US has used it but not to its full potential. Baku could become the center of a lot of trouble for Iran. Someday Tabriz could turn into the next Aleppo. I hope not.

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